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COMMENTS
CrnzENSHIP-lNTENT REQUIRED FOR EXPATRIATION-In recent
years, many cases have involved the question whether an American
citizen has expatriated himself by his actions. Expatriation in the United
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States is now covered by statute, but the courts, in construing these
statutes, have faced a recurrent problem as to what intent on the part
of the citizen is required to effect expatriation. To interpret the present doctrine, it is necessary to examine the history of expatriation, the
statutes, and the various situations in which the question of intent has
arisen.

I
Before 1868, American courts generally followed the English common law and held that a citizen had no inherent right to expatriate himself; expatriation required the consent of the sovereign.1 The executive
department, however, generally held otherwise, and recognized a right
of voluntary expatriation in the individual. 2 This doctrine arose almost
by necessity to protect naturalized American citizens who returned to
their native lands and were met by claims on their allegiance by their
former sovereigns. 3 The problem became acute with the B.ood of immigration in the middle of the 19th Century. In 1868, naturalized
American citizens, who were former British subjects, were arrested in
Ireland by the British government for participation in Fenian agitation,
on the basis that they were still British subjects. This caused great
public resentment and led to the passage of the Act of 1868.4 This
is merely a declaration that since expatriation is a natural and inherent
right of all people, and since in recognition of this principle the government has freely received emigrants of all nations and given them citizenship, any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision that
denies or restricts the right is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the republic.11 In view of the background and statement of
purpose of this statute, it was primarily intended to apply to immi1 MooRB, DmEsT oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 552 et seq. (1906); BonCHARD, THE
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION oF CrnZENs .ABROAD 675 (1915); MooRE, PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 270-4 (1918); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1146 (1945); FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 258 (1948); Flournoy, "Naturalization and Expatriation," 31
YALE L.J. 702, 848 (1922). Shank v. Dupont, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 242 (1830); Ainslie v.
Martin, 9 Mass. 454 (1813); Ex parte Chin King, (C.C. Ore. 1888) 35 F. 354; Comitis v.
Parkerson, (C.C. La. 1893) 56 F. 556. Cf. Juando v. Taylor, (C.C. N.Y. 1818) 2 Paine

652.
2 3 MooRB, DrcEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 et seq. (1906); 8 OP. ATrY. GEN.
139 (1856); 9 OP. ATrY. GEN. 356 (1859).
a BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CrnZENS ABROAD 675-6 (1915);
MooRE, THE PRINCIPLES oF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 274-85 (1918); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1147 (1945); FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 258 (1948); Flournoy, "Naturalization and Expatriation," 31 YALE L.J. 702, 848 (1922).
4 3 MooRB, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 579-81 (1906); BoRCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION oF CITIZENS .ABnoAD 676 (1915); MooRB, PRINCIPLES oF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 285-90 (1918); Borchard, 25 AM. J. !Nr. L. 312 (1931).
5 15 Stat. L. 223 (1868), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §800.
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grants naturalized here; but its language is not so limited, and it is construed to apply to American citizens, and to be the consent required
to allow them to expatriate themselves. 6
This statute contained no statement of what acts were sufficient to
constitute expatriation. In spite of requests by President Grant for such
a declaration,7 nothing was done until 1907. In that year, Congress
enacted a statute providing that any American woman who marries
a foreigner takes the nationality of her husband, and that an American
citizen is deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in a foreign state, or has taken an oath of allegiance to a foreign
state in conformity with its laws. 8 The statute also established presumptions of expatriation for naturalized citizens resulting from their residence abroad. Except for the provision as to marriage by an American
woman to a foreigner, which was repealed in 1922,9 this remained the
statutory declaration as to what constituted expatriation until the Nationality Act of 1940.10 This act gives more detailed statements of what
constitutes expatriation. These provisions will be examined below.

II
The Act of 1868 declared only a right of expatriation and thus put
expatriation on a voluntary basis. Clearly, for expatriation, there had to
be an intent to lose citizenship. But both the Act of 1907 and the Nationality Act of 1940 establish acts that constitute .expatriation without reference to intent, and the courts have been troubled as to the
intent that is required to lose citizenship under these provisions. There
are many statements that expatriation is a voluntary renunciation of
nationality.11 It has been held that the person must be capable of having an intent and of knowing the consequences of his act. Thus it was
6

BoRCHAllD,

THB

DrPLoMAnc P:ROTEcnON oF CrnZENs ABROAD 679 (1915); 14

Arn. GBN. 295 (1873); United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband, (2d. Cir. 1925)
6 F. (2d) 957; Edwards v. United States, (8th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 357.

Qp.

7 3 MooRB, DIGEST oF lNTERNAnoNAL I.Aw 712-4 (1906).
s 34 Stat. L. 1228 (1907).
9 42 Stat. L. 1021 (1922).
.
10 54 Stat. L. 1137, §401 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §801. These provisions have been
amended; 58 Stat. L. 4 (1944), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §80l(g); 58 Stat. L. 677 (1944), 8
U.S.C. (1946) §80l(i); 58 Stat. L. 746 (1944), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §80l(j). See Flournoy,
"Revision of Nationality Law of the United States," 34 AM. J. !NT. L. 36 (1940).
113 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF !NrERNATIONAL LAW 209-11, 230 (1942); VAN Dnm,
CrnZENsmP oF THB UNITED STATES 269 (1904); BoRcHARD, THB DxPLOMAnc PRoTEcnoN OF CrnzENS ABROAD 674 (1915). Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884 (1939);
Doreau v. Marshall, (3d Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 721; Ex parte Griffin, (D.C. N.Y.
1916) 237 F. 445; Banning v. Penrose, (D.C. Ga. 1919) 255 F. 159; Haaland v. Attorney
General of the United States, (D.C. Md. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 13.
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held that neither a minor1 2 nor an insane person13 could expatriate himself by his acts. It seems that this requirement as to capacity is still
observed, although the Nationality Act of 1940 lowers the age as to
minors from 21 to 18.14
However, an intent to lose citizenship has not always been required.
In the case of Mackenzie 11. Hare,1 5 which arose under the Act of 1907,
an American woman who married an alien claimed that she had not lost
her American citizenship, since she did not so intend. The Court
held that under the statute, she lost her citizenship by the marriage.
The Court did not decide whether Congress has power to provide for
expatriation by other than a voluntary act;16 the Court rather found
that since the marriage was a voluntary act, and was by statute equivalent to expatriation, the expatriation was voluntary.
Perhaps the greatest dispute has arisen when a child who is an
American citizen acquires the nationality of another country by the acts
of his parents. Here it seems clear that in the ordinary situation the
child has no intent to lose citizenship; and even if he does have such an
intent, it is not recognized as binding.17 Earlier rulings had held that
there was no expatriation in this situation,1 8 but these were followed by
several holdings to the contrary, beginning about 1930.19 Some of
12 2 HYDE, !NnmNATIONAL LAw 1161-3 (1945); Ex parte Chin King, (C.C. Ore.
1888) 35 F. 354; United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 44.
1s McCampbell v. McCampbell, (D.C. Ky. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 847.
14 Section 403(b) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, provides that no
national under the age of eighteen can expatriate himself, except by treason, a written
renunciation of citizenship within the United States, or staying outside the United States
to avoid military service; 8 U.S.C. (1946) §803(b). The explanatory comments of the
Cabinet Committee accompanying the draft code state that "it is believed that a person who
has reached the age of eighteen years should be able to appreciate fully the seriousness of
any act of expatriation on his part." Message from the President to Congress, transmitting
the report of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Labor, and Attorney General proposing a
revision of the nationality laws submitted June I, 1938; found in Hearings before the House
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939), Hearing to
Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States, p. 405 at 493.
1° 239 U.S. 299, 36 S.Ct. 106 (1915).
16 "It may be conceded that a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed, that
is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen. The law in controversy does not have
that feature." Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 at 311, 36 S.Ct 106 (1915).
17 Ex parte Chin King, (C.C. Ore. 1888) 35 F. 354; United States ex rel. Baglivo v.
Day, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 44.
1 8 15 OP. Am. GEN. 15 (1875); Ex parte Chin King, (C.C. Ore. 1888) 35 F. 354;
3 MooRB, DmEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 532-51 (1906).
19 3 HACKWORTH, Th:GEST oF !NTERNATIOAL LAw 235-9 (1942); 36 OP. Am. GEN.
535 (1932); Ostby v. Salmon, 177 Minn. 289, 225 N.W. 158 (1929); Koppe v. Pfefferle,
188 Minn. 619, 248 N.W. 41 (1933); United States v. Reid, (9th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d)
153. In two private acts, Congress provided that whereas a minor had involuntarily lost
his citizenship when his parents left this country, he was by this act considered legally
admitted to the country, and could become a citizen by taking an oath; 50 Stat. L. 1030
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these were on the basis of treaties whereby the United States recognized the acquisition of the nationality of the other country by American citizens who acquired such nationality under the laws of that
country.20
The Supreme Court faced the problem in Perkins v. Elg. 21 Here
petitioner, who sought a declaratory judgment establishing her citizenship, was born in the United States and taken to Sweden by her parents
while she was a minor. Her parents were naturalized there, so that she
acquired citizenship under Swedish law; the United States by treaty
was bound to recognize such citizenship. The Court held that even
though the child acquired Swedish nationality, she did not lose her
American citizenship, since expatriation is a voluntary renunciation of
citizenship.22 The Court recognized that the minor, on becoming of
age, has a right of election between the two nationalities. Here it
found that petitioner had made an election in favor of her American
nationality. The Nationality Act of 1940 substantially enacts the rule
of this case,23 and provides for the method of exercise of the election.24
The question of expatriation frequently arises in connection with ·
military service in a foreign army. The Nationality Act of 1940 provides for loss of citizenship only when the citizen has, or by his service,
acquires, the nationality of the other country.25 Expatriation usually
occurs when the soldier takes the customary oath of allegiance upon his
induction. Then, unless the person is unable to expatriate himself
because of being under age,26 such an oath clearly causes expatriation
(1937); 52 Stat. L. 1410 (1938). The Court in the case of Perkins v. Elg did not regard
these as significant in showing any intent on the part of Congress that citizenship should
be lost in such cases; 307 U.S. 325 at 349, 59 S.Ct. 884 (1939).
20 Ostby v. Salmon, 177 Minn. 289, 225 N.W. 158 (1929); Koppe v. Pfefferle, 188
Minn. 619, 248 N.W. 41 (1933); United States v. Reid, (9th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 153.
21 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884 (1939).
22 ''Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and
allegiance. It has no application to the removal from this country of a native citizen during
minority. In such a case the voluntary action which is of the essence of the right of expatriation is lacking." Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 at 334, 59 S.Ct. 884 (1939).
23 Nationality Act of 1940, §401(a), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §80l(a). See 60 HARv. L.
RBv. 977 (1947).
24 Ibid. As to what constitutes an election, see: 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST 01' lNTERNAnoNAL LAw 369-74 (1942); Attorney General of the United States v. Ricketts, (9th Cir.
1947) 165 F. (2d) 193; Haaland v. Attorney General of the United States, (D.C. Md.
1941) 42 F. Supp. 13; Schaufus v. Attorney General of the United States, (D.C. Md.
1942) 45 F. Supp. 61.
25 Nationality Act of 1940, §40l(c), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §801(c).
26 Nationality Act of 1940, §403(b), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §803(b); United States ex rel.
Baglivo v. Day, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 44.
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when voluntarily taken. 27 However, in ·the case of Dos Reis ex rel.
Camara v. Nicolls, 28 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
petitioner, who was born in the United States and taken to the Azores
at the age of 12, did not lose his citizenship when inducted into the
Portuguese army over his objections, the only alternative to such service
being confinement in a concentration camp. He did not swear allegiance to Portugal at any time. The court reviewed the legislative history of this provision of the Nationality Act of 1940 and concluded that
there was no intention to deprive anyone of his citizenship when he
was involuntarily inducted into a foreign army.29 The courts have uniformly held, both before and after the Nationality Act of 1940, that
to cause expatriation the military service must be voluntary, and that
there is no expatriation when the service is under duress. As in the
Dos Reis case, they have been ready to £.nd such duress. 30
An oath of renunciation of citizenship is also established by statute
as a way in which to effect expatriation. 31 Several recent cases have in·
valved oaths renouncing citizenship taken by many· Japanese-Ameri·
cans while being held at relocation centers during the war.. After an ex·
haustive review of the conditions that existed in these relocation centers, the courts have cancelled many of these renunciations on the
basis that the renunciations were coerced and not voluntary, because of
the sometimes inhuman treatment accorded by the government and the
27 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST 011 INTBRNAnoNAL LAw 224-5, 374-6 (1942); Bauer v.
Clark, (7th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 397; Ex parte Griffin, (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 237 F. 445;
United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, (D.C. Pa. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 219; United States
ex rel. Wrona v. Karnuth, (D.C. N.Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 770; United States ex rel.
Fracassi v. Karnuth, (D.C. N.Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 581; United States ex rel. DeCicco v.
Longo, (D.C. Conn. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 170; Petition of Di Iorio, (D.C. Mass. 1949) 86
F. Supp. 479.
2s (1st Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 860.
29 The district court, in finding against petitioner, held that the induction was involuntary, and that Congress intended to effect a loss of citizenship even for an involuntary act.
The court emphasized the fact that Congress did not use the word expatriation, generally
defined as a voluntary act, in these sections of the Nationality Act of 1940. Dos Reis ex
rel. Camara v. Nicolls, (D.C. Mass. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 773.
so 40 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 553 (1947); State v. Adams, 45 Iowa 99 (1876); Podea v. Acheson, (2d Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 306; In re Gogal, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 268;
Ishikawa v. Acheson, (D.C. Hawaii 1949) 85 F. Supp. l; Yoshira Shibata v. Acheson,
(D.C. Cal. 1949) 86 F. Supp. l; Kanno v. Acheson, (D.C. Cal. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 183.
Cf. Zimmer v. Acheson, (D.C. Kan. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 313; petitioner here was a German
citizen at the time of his induction into the German army. He alleged that he entered the
army without making any protest to the American consulate because of threats made by the
Gestapo. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show that petitioner was
forced to enter the army, that he voluntarily entered, and thus lost his United States citizenship.
s1 58 Stat. L. 677 (1944), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §80I(i).
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threats of violence made by gangs of disloyal internees who intimidated
these prisoners. 32
Perhaps the most common way to lose citizenship is by naturalization in another country by one's own act. This basis of expatriation is
recognized by both the Act of 1907 and the Nationality Act of 1940.83
The courts have also recognized here that the act must be voluntary,
and have held that there is no expatriation when the naturalization is
under duress; again, they have been willing to find duress rather readily.34 Another well recognized method of expatriation is an oath of allegiance to another country.35 Again, it seems that there must be a voluntary oath, so that there is no expatriation if the act is done under
duress.88
The Supreme Court recently considered the problem of intent in
the case of Savorgnan v. United States,37 which involved both naturalization and an oath of allegiance. Petitioner brought an action for a
judgment declaring her to be an American citizen. She was born in
the United States. In 1940 she wished to marry an Italian Vice-Consul
stationed in this country. He told her that to marry him, she would
have to become an Italian citizen in order to secure the necessary royal
consent to the marriage. Petitioner applied for Italian citizenship.
Savorgnan prepared the application, which was in Italian, for her,
since she did not understand Italian. She was then granted Italian citizenship. Subsequently she signed another instrument, also in Italian,
that contained an oath renouncing her American citizenship and swearing allegiance to the King of Italy. The two were married. Petitioner
went to Italy with her husband when he was forced to return in 1941.
s2 Acheson v. Murakami, (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 953; Inouye v. Clark, (D.C.
Cal. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 1000, reversed for insufficiencies in the pleadings, Clark v. Inouye,
(9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 740; Tadayasu Abo v. Clark, (D.C. Cal. 1948) 77 F. Supp.
806.
88 34 Stat. L. 1228, §2 (1907); Nationality Act of 1940, §40l(a), 8 U.S.C. (1946)
§801(a). The same rule applied without statute; 3 MooRB, DIGEST OP lNrERNATIONAL
I.Aw 711 (1906); BoRCHAllD, THB DIPLOMATIC PRoTECTION OP CITIZENS ABROAD 681
(1915).
84 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OP lNrERNATIONAL LAW 209-17 (1942); Doreau v. Marshall, (3d Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 721; Schioler v. United States, (D.C. ill. 1948) 75 F.
Supp. 353, affirmed on other grounds, Schioler v. Secretary of State of the United States,
(7th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 402; Meiji Fujizawa v. Acheson, (D.C. Cal. 1949) 85 F.
Supp. 674. Cf. Dubonnet v. Marshall, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 905.
85 34 Stat, L. 1228, §2 (1907); Nationality Act of 1940, §401(b), 8 U.S.C. (1946)
§801(b). This rule also applied without statute; 3 MooRB, DIGEST OP lNrERNATIONAL
I.Aw 718-30 (1906); BoRCHAlID, THB DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OP CITIZENS ABROAD 682
(1915); Browne v. Dexter, 66 Cal. 39, 4 P. 913 (1884).
86 3 HAcxwoRTH, DIGEST oP L"ITERNATIONAL I.Aw 224-6 (1942).
87 338 U.S. 491, 70 S.Ct. 292 (1950).
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After the war, petitioner applied for registration as an American citizen,
but this was denied. She returned to America on an Italian diplomatic
passport, and after her return, sought to be listed as an American citizen. Her request was again denied. The district court found, as facts,
that she had not intended to renounce her American citizenship, that
she assumed that the document was only a step in obtaining consent to
marry, and that she did not intend to establish a permanent residence
in Italy.
The district court, relying entirely on the Elg case, found for petitioner, because she did not intend to renounce her American citizens4ip.38 The court of appeals reversed, finding that petitioner had acted
voluntarily.39 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision,40 finding
that the naturalization was sufficient to constitute expatriation, and
recognizing that the oath would have the same result. 41 The Court
emphasized that the Act of I 868 shows an American doctrine favoring freedom of expatriation. The Court also relied on the Mackenzie
case, and a general policy against dual nationality,42 but the main basis
38 Savorgnan v. United States, (D.C. Wis. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 109.
39 Savorgnan v. United States, (7th Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 155.
40 Justices Frankfurter and Black dissented on the basis that expatriation depends on
facts, and the district court found the facts in favor of petitioner.
41 The Court refused to decide when the expatriation took place, when the petitioner
was naturalized or when she left the country. The gove=ent argued that under the Act
of 1907 there was no need for petitioner to leave the country to complete her expatriation.
Before the Act of 1907 a change of residence was generally required. V.AN DYNE, CrnzENSHIP OF THB UNITED STATES 273 (1904); BoRCHARJ?, THE TuPLoMAnc PROTECTION OF
CmZBNs &ROAD 679 (1915); 2 HYDE, lNrnRNATIONAL LAw 1161 (1945); Talbot v.
Janson, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 133 (1795); The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. (20 U.S.) 283
(1822); Comitis v. Parkerson, (C.C. La. 1893) 56 F. 556. Section 403(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. (1946) §803(a) requires leaving the country, except when the
expatriation is by desertion from the military forces, treason, or a written renunciation in
the United States. Cf. Ex parte Tadayasu Abo, (D.C. Cal. 1947) 76 F. Supp. 664. Since
there is no requirement stated in the Act of 1907 the government contended that it was
not necessary. The State Department has required departure under the Act of 1907; 3
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF lNrnRNATIONAL LAw 231-5 (1942). Although the Court refused
to pass on the question here, it found expatriation without departure in the Mackenzie case.
Petitioner argued that since the Act of 1907 refers to being naturalized in a foreign
state, the citizen must be physically present in that country at the time of naturalization.
The Court dismissed this argument by saying that the act meant naturalization into the
citizenship of the foreign state, and that this intent was made clearer by the Nationality
Act of 1940 which refers to obtaining naturalization in a foreign state, and which requires
a departure for expatriation.
A somewhat similar case arose when a naturalized American citizen, about to be
married in Italy, was required to renounce his American citizenship before the ceremony
could be performed. The renunciation was made only to avoid delay in the marriage, and
on the assumption that the Italian nationality was not imposed on him. The Department
of State held in 1931 that he was entitled to a passport. 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INrnnNATIONAL LAw 373 (1942).
4 2 It seems that the Nationality Act of 1940 was intended to end dual nationality; 86
CoNG. REc., part 11, pp. 11944, 11948 (1940); 60 HAnv. L. REv. 977 (1947). For the
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of the decision seemed to be that the language of the Nationality Act
of 1940 is objective and that under its terms no subjective intent is
necessary. 43 The Court holds instead that it is enough for the person
voluntarily to do the act stated by the statute to constitute expatria~
tion, 44 and recognizes that there is no expatriation if there is duress. 4 cs
The Court did not discuss the Elg case.

III
From the Savorgnan case, it seems that the test now applied by
the Supreme Court is whether there is an intent to do the act that constitutes expatriation. In determining whether there is such an intent,
the courts will inquire as to whether the person is capable of forming
the intent, and will investigate to see whether the person acted freely in
doing the act, or whether the act was coerced or performed under duress.
It seems that duress will readily be found. Once it is found that the
citizen had an intent to do the act which constitutes expatriation, he is
bound by the legal consequences of his act. That he did not intend to
effect expatriation by these acts or did not know that expatriation would
follow is irrelevant.46
arguments against dual nationality, see: Von Zedtwitz v. Sutherland, (D.C. Cir. 1928) 26
F. (2d) 525; Flournoy, "Dual Nationality and Election," 30 YALE L.J. 545, 693 (1921);
23 AM. J. !Nr. L., Spec. Supp. 38 (1929); 23 GEo. L.J. 507 (1935).
48 ''There is no suggestion in the statutory language that the effect of the specified
overt acts, when voluntarily done, is conditioned upon the undisclosed intent of the person
doing them•••• The legislative history of the Nationality Act of 1940 contains no intimation that subjective intent is material to the issue of expatriation." Savorgnan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 491 at 499-501, 70 S.Ct. 292 (1950).
44 "In §401 of the Act of 1940, Congress has added a number of per se acts of
expatriation.••• Lack of intent to abandon American citizenship certainly could not offset
any of these. A fortiori a mature citizen who accepted naturalization into the full citizenship of a foreign state could not have been intended by Congress to have greater freedom
to establish duality of citizenship." Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 at 501, 70
S.Ct. 292 (1950).
45 Id. at 502.
46 ''The Act (Nationality Act of 1940) does not arbitrarily impose a loss of citizenship. It deals with a condition voluntarily brought about by one's own acts, with notice
of the consequences. In that sense there is concurrence by the citizen." Lapides v. Clark,
(D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 619 at 621. United States ex rel. Lapides v. Watkins,
(2d Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 1017 holds the same on the same facts. These cases involve
loss of citizenship by a naturalized citizen resulting from residence abroad; Nationality
Act of 1940, §404(c), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §804(c).
Section 40l(e) of the Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. (1946) §801(e) provides for loss
of citizenship for voting in a political election in a foreign state. Petitioner, born in the
United States, voted in an election in 1946 in Japan, after General MacArthur urged all
women to vote, and after petitioner had been threatened with having her food rations cut
off for not voting. The court held that petitioner did not lose her American citizenship,
both because this was not an election in a foreign state and because she acted under duress
and coercion. Etsuko Arikawa v. Acheson, (D.C. Cal. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 473. Accord:
Hatsuye Ouye v. Acheson, (D.C. Hawaii 1950) 91 F. Supp. 129. Cf. Cantoni v. Acheson,
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This result seems to reconcile the cases on the subject. There have
been statements that the renunciation must be voluntary, but almost
all holdings that there was no expatriation, including the Elg case, can
be explained on the basis that the act claimed to be expatriation was not
voluntary. In this respect, the broader statements of the Elg case and
many other cases (some of which .rely on the Elg case) that the renunciation must be voluntary are unnecessary for the result and are now
repudiated by the Savorgnan case.
Although this view is more strict than that previously stated, the
courts are still reluctant to find expatriation, since there still must be an
intent to do the act, which intent must be clearly shown. It would seem
that this reluctance. comes from two sources. Historically, doctrines
. of expatriation developed in this country on the basis that it was
a voluntary act by the citizen. The government did not undertake to change this in any way until 1907, and had previously recognized the voluntary basis. The first statement, the Act of 1907, was
very general. Even though Congress has now prescribed more fully
what constitutes expatriation, the courts continue to speak of voluntary
acts, although now in a modified way. In addition, the courts are·reluctant to deprive a person of his citizenship when he makes a claim to it.
It is recognized that a person may renounce citizenship, but the courts
have regarded American citizenship as a high privilege and have been
(D.C. Cal. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 576, where petitioner had served in the Italian anny and voted
in an Italian election. Petitioner knew that he was born in the United States, but at the time
of these acts did not know that he was a citizen. The court held that petitioner had lost
his citizenship, since these acts were voluntary. And in Kazdy-Reich v. Marshall, (D.C.
D.C. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 787, petitioner who lived in Hungary had voted in an election
there, for the purpose of defeating the Communists; she was not threatened at any time, but
feared the Communists. The court held that petitioner had renounced, although she did
not know that this was the effect of her acts at the time.
Statute provides for expatriation by departing from or remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States during a war or national emergency to evade service in the anned
forces. 58 Stat. L. 746 (1944), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §80l(j). Petitioner, who had been
born here, was taken to Mexico by his parents and remained there during World War II.
He had little education, had no newspaper in his home, and heard no radio during the
period. The court held that he had not lost his citizenship, since his remaining in Mexico
was not wilful and not to avoid service. Ponce v. McGrath, (D.C. Cal. 1950) 91 F. Supp.
23.
The present statutes also provide for expatriation by accepting or performing the
duties of any office under the government of a foreign state for which only nationals of
such state are eligible; by a formal renunciation before a diplomatic officer of the United
States or a foreign state; by conviction for desertion from the anned services of the United
States in time of war when the conviction results in a dishonorable discharge; by commission of treason against tlie United States and conviction therefor. Nationality Act of 1940,
§401; 58 Stat. L. 4, 677 (1944); 8 U.S.C. (1946) §801.
It seems clear that the courts would apply the same tests to these types of expatriation.
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reluctant to take it away. 47 This reluctance may be partly due to the
difficulties of regaining citizenship once it is lost.48
The present interpretation, as shown by the Savorgnan case, seems
to be a fair solution of the problem. It gives a reasonable interpretation
to the statutes,49 and does not seem to work any injustice, at least in the
normal situation. However, it seems that the present view is based on
statutory construction and is not an expression of any limitation on the
power of Congress. There is no restraint imposed on this power by
international law,50 and it seems doubtful that any is imposed by the
Constitution,'11 at least as long as the provisions are reasonable.52

Willis B. Snell, S. Ed.

47 "To decitizenize a freeman is a tremendous blow. It deprives him of his chosen
countxy and home, and sunders his most endearing relations, social and civil." Burkett v.
McCarty, 10 Bush (73 Ky.) 758 at 760 (1866). See also, In re Wildberger, (D.C. Pa.
1914) 214 F. 508; McCampbell v. McCampbell, (D.C. Ky. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 847; 23
GBo. L.J. 507 (1935); 7 GBo. WAsH. L. REv. 639 (1939).
48 60 Hmv. L. REv. 977 (1947).
49 This may be a stricter interpretation than was intended. In the Letter of Submittal
to the President, the Cabinet Committee delegated to draft the Nationality Code said: ''None
of the various provisions in the Code concerning loss of American nationality • • • is
designed to be punitive or to interfere with freedom of action. They are merely intended
to deprive persons of American nationality when such persons, by their own acts, or inaction, show that their real attachment is to the foreign countxy and not to the United States."
Message from the President to Congress, transmitting the report of the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Labor, and Attorney General proposing a revision of the nationality laws submitted June I, 1938; found in Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939), Hearing to Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States, p. 405 at 409.
150 FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 257 (1948); Preuss, "International Law and Deprivation of Nationality," 23 GBo. L.J. 250 (1935). For the law of other nations, see:
Sandifer, "Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of
Nationality," 29 AM. J. INT. L. 248 (1935); 23 AM. J. INT. L., Spec. Supp. 100 (1929).
51 "As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty.
As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which
concern its relations and intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before
limiting or embarrassing such powers." Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 at 311, 36 S.Ct.
106 (1915). See also: Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884 (1939); Ex parte
(NG) Fung Sing, (D.C. Wash. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 670; United States ex rel. Wrona v.
Karnuth, (D.C. N.Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 770; Petition of Peterson, (D.C. Wash. 1940)
33 F. Supp. 615; 33 MrCH. L. REv. 1271 (1935); 60 HARv. L. REv. 977 (1940). Cf.
Burkett v. McCarty, 10 Bush (73 Ky.) 758 (1866); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456 (1898); Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, (1st Cir. 1947) 161
F. (2d) 860.
5 2 "Conceivably the Fourteenth Amendment forbids treaties providing for 'unreasonable' expatriation, but that is not the equivalent of 'involuntary expatriation'. • ••" Orfield.
''Expatriation of American Minors," 38 MrCH. L. REv. 585 at 592 (1940).

